Friday, October 9, 2015

Maltese Defendant asking to speak with uncle counts as Miranda right to ...







Defendant asking to speak with uncle counts as Miranda right to remain silent

 State v. Maltese 221 NJ 611 (2015)

Because defendant’s statement to his uncle occurred after officers violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that statement is inadmissible. Defendant’s subsequent statement to police was fruit of the unconstitutionally obtained statement to his uncle and must also be suppressed. Thus, defendant’s convictions for manslaughter and murder are reversed. His other convictions are affirmed because they are supported by evidence independent of the suppressed statements. On remand, the trial court shall conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether the physical evidence obtained as a result of defendant’s suppressed statements is admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.

: Because defendant’s statement to his uncle occurred after officers violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that statement is inadmissible. Defendant’s subsequent statement to police was fruit of the unconstitutionally obtained statement to his uncle and must also be suppressed. Thus, defendant’s convictions for manslaughter and murder are reversed. His other convictions are affirmed because they are supported by evidence independent of the suppressed statements. On remand, the trial court shall conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether the physical evidence obtained as a result of defendant’s suppressed statements is admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.

1. The privilege against self-incrimination includes the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak of his own free will. Efforts by police to persuade a suspect to talk are proper as long as the will of the suspect is not overborne. The inquiry turns on whether an investigator’s statements were so manipulative or coercive that they deprived defendant of his ability to make an autonomous decision to confess. Once a defendant unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent, interrogation must cease. Further, even when the suspect’s invocation is ambiguous, officers are required to stop the interrogation completely, or to ask only questions narrowly directed to determine whether defendant is willing to continue. Of particular relevance to this matter, in State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407 (1990), this Court addressed a situation in which a defendant requested permission to speak with his father. There, the Court held that the defendant’s request was sufficient to invoke his right to remain silent, and therefore required the interrogation to cease. As in Harvey, defendant here indicated that he wanted to speak with a family member to obtain advice before proceeding with questioning. Considering the circumstances, defendant affirmatively asserted his right to remain silent. Therefore, the statement he made to his uncle was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and was properly suppressed by the trial court. (

2. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). There, the Court focused on four factors: (1) two hours passed after the defendant first asserted his right to remain silent; (2) the defendant received fresh Miranda warnings before the interrogation resumed; (3) the defendant was questioned by a different police officer; and (4) the defendant was questioned about a different crime. Here, the break in questioning was less than seven minutes, defendant was always in the presence of an officer, and the officers who took defendant’s statement were known by defendant to be conducting the investigation. Additionally, after defendant confessed to his uncle, police made it clear that they knew about that confession. Considering these factors, the statement to police was the fruit of the unconstitutionally obtained statement to his uncle.

3. As for whether the admission of defendant’s statement to police constituted harmless error, the Court notes that all of his convictions, with the exception of the convictions for manslaughter and murder, were independently substantiated by evidence other than his statement to police. However, because that statement was particularly relevant to the manslaughter and murder convictions, the Court cannot conclude that the statement’s admission was harmless. Therefore, while his other convictions are affirmed, his manslaughter and murder convictions are reversed and the matter is remanded for retrial. On retrial, the statements may be used for impeachment purposes if defendant chooses to testify.

State v. Maltese (A-96-13) (073584)



Argued March 3, 2015 -- Decided August 17, 2015

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